jueves, 2 de noviembre de 2017

The Forgotten Empire: Does the United States practice what it preaches?

       Two cases were recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding Puerto Rico and its constitutional relationship with the United States. These cases were Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle[1]and Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust [2].  Congress recently passed a legislation called “The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act[3], ironically referred as “PROMESA” (promise in Spanish), to which the government of Puerto Rico was placed on a trusteeship by the U.S. government. With the passing of this legislation the United States government strengthen the colonial grip of plenary power that were validated a century ago in the Insular Cases[4].

       Does the United States practice what it preaches? The United States is well known for actively promoting democracy values in the world. Unfortunately, it does not in relation with the political and constitutional rights of the people who reside in non-state jurisdictions. These jurisdictions are often referred as “territories”, “possessions” when they are de facto and de jure colonies. In January 13, 2016 files the reports as required by Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter, part of the UN Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories[5]. Regarding Puerto Rico, the United States ceased filing these reports in 1952, following representations in the General Assembly of the United Nations to the effect that Puerto Rico had become a self-governing entity by reason of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. These arguments, made with success in 1952, did not represented the true constitutional situation when they were made nor have they become truer. Any doubt of this assertion may be eliminated by consulting the United States Supreme Court Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, in which the Supreme Court confirmed that the approval of self-governing of Puerto Rico in 1952 did not change Puerto Rico’s fundamental constitutional status as a United States territory, subject to the authority of Congress under the Territorial Clause.

      A more present example of Congress’s colonial control over Puerto Rico can be clearly seen in the previously mention “PROMESA” law which established a so-called “Oversight Board”, a non-elective entity seven members appointed by the President. The Board has the power to impose deadlines on the government of Puerto Rico for developing a fiscal plan and a budget that meets with the criteria set by Congress, as well as to the right to reject’s Puerto Rico’s proposal. The law, also gives the prerogative to demand any information and documentation that they believe its relevant from the Government of Puerto Rico, and also requires the Puerto Rico’s legislative to submit all acts it passes along with estimates of their cost for evaluation by the Board. The Board can determine that an act passed by the Puerto Rican legislature is inconsistent with the fiscal plan, it may unilaterally dictate that the act can be changed or simply overrule the Government of Puerto Rico. The Board can require the government of Puerto Rico. The Board can require the Government of Puerto Rico to submit all contracts and leases to the Board for approval.

    The present constitutional relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico began with the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which ended the Spanish American War. In providing for the cession of Puerto Rico from Spain to the United States, the Treaty stated, in its Article IX, that “the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants shall be determine by Congress.” This provision was contrary to earlier practice in the territorial expansion of American legal history. In all prior cases, upon acquiring additional territory, United States citizenship and rights were granted to the inhabitants of the nearly acquire lands irrespective of the means used to add those territories to the nation’s domain.[6]

   The practice instituted after the Spanish American War departed not only from past United States practice, but were also were a retrogression from how things were done in Puerto Rico during the Spanish rule. The island was a province of Spain (the equivalent of State under the United States forms of government). Puerto Ricans were full Spanish citizens with the right to elect sixteen delegated and three senators to the Spanish Cortes (equivalent to Congress).[7]

   Shortly after the invasion in 1898, General Miles proclaimed to the Puerto Rican population that the United States would “promote the prosperity and bestow the immunities and blessings of the United States enlightenment and liberal institutions and governments.”[8] Sadly, the United States imposed a military regime that abolished all forms of democratic representation in the local government. Despite these promises from General Miles, the colonial powers negotiated the Treaty of Paris and enacted Article IX without Puerto Rican participation or consent. Puerto Rico inhabitants were stripped of their Spanish citizenship and rights and were required to give allegiance to a new colonial overseer under whom they would be without any rights except those that Congress, in which they had and have no vote, chose to grant.  One of the first things done by the Military Government was to deny the inhabitants of Puerto Rico the fundamental right of free speech. People who wrote against the establishment of the military government, defending democracy, were persecuted by the military, had their printing press burn, and were prosecuted in military tribunals without a right of habeas corpus. One of the military orders regarding free speech by General Guy V. Henry stated the following:

"This General Government does not allow the publication of writings in which reference is made to the Army of the United States or to the Military Government, lest de extreme case such publicity can be justified with CONCLUSIVE PROOF.[9]
  
  Is Article IX of the Treaty of Paris unconstitutional? In Boumediene v. Bush[10] Justice Kennedy stated, “the constitution has the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.”

   In Loughborough v. Blake[11] Chief Justice Marshall stated:

"Does the United States designate the whole, or any particular portion of the American empire? Certainly, this question can admit but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of the states and the territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is no less within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of the constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties, and excises, should be observed in one, than in the other."

   In Flemin v. Page[12] Chief Justice Taney stated: 

"The country in question had been conquered in war. But the genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general government to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the rights of its citizens. A war, therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's country. The United States, it is true, may extend its boundaries by conquest or treaty, and may demand the cession of territory as the condition of peace, in order to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they have suffered, or to reimburse the government for the expenses of the war. But this can be done only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority, and is not a part of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war. His duty and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States. But his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power."

   In Scott v. Standford[13] Chief Justice Taney stated:

“There is certainly no power given in the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by admission of new states… No power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and governed in a permanently colonial character.”

  The Stanford Court went to rule that the Territorial Clause[14] in Article IV of the Constitution was not applicable to territories after the United States independence from Great Britain. Chief Justice Taney held that the territorial clause was relevant to those lands held at the time of the treaty with Great Britain in 1783[15] (Old Northwest Territories)[16], but did not apply to land acquire thereafter.
                       
   It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to conclude that any treaty can’t trump the Constitution by granting Congress powers that exceed those allowed by the document.[17] Unfortunately, the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris and the Insular Cases coincided with the end of the progressive movement and the rise of imperialism in the United States. Legally speaking, we can argue that the Insular Cases during the Fuller Court caused great controversy in the legal profession of the time, but they were left nearly forgotten, hidden in the shadows of other controversial cases like: United States v. E.C. Knight[18] ; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &Trust Co.[19]; In Re Debs[20]; Plessy v. Ferguson[21]; Champion v. Ames[22]; Lochner v. New York.[23] A similar composition of the Fuller Court in 1886 ruled, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins[24], that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal rights “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of NATIONALITY.”

 In 1899, the Carroll Commission, appointed by President McKinley to investigate prevailing conditions in Puerto Rico, concluded that there should be “no hesitation in affirming that the people of Puerto Rico have good claims to be considered capable of self-government.”[25] The military governor of Puerto Rico at the time, General Davis, challenged the Commission recommendations stating that “the people of Puerto Rico generally have no conception of political rights combined with political responsibilities.”[26]Congress proceeded to enact the Foraker Act of 1900.[27] Congress accomplished with this act the following: create a colonial apparatus to replace the military regime, that had rule in Puerto Rico since its invasion, and raising money to fund this new administration.

  The Foraker Act provided for the establishment for a civil government composed of a presidential appointed governor, a supreme court, and an upper legislative body, with a lower house body elected by the Puerto Ricans. Established tax goods imported into Puerto Rico from the mainland United States, the proceeds which would be used to fund expenses of the new established government.[28] Such tax was alleged to violate the uniformity provision of the taxing and expenses clause of the Constitution. It was challenged as unconstitutional and became part of what we know as the Insular Cases.

  Historian Rubin Francis Weston describes what actually happened in the political arena during the rise of imperialism in the beginning of the 20th century:

Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: what kind of relationship would the new people have to the body politic? Was it to be the relationship of the reconstruction period, an attempt at political equality for dissimilar races, or was it to be the southern counterrevolutionary point of view which denied the basic American constitutional rights to people of color? The actions of the federal government during the imperial period and the relegation of the negro to the status of second class citizenship indicate that the southern point of view prevailed. The racism which caused the relegation of the negro to a status of inferiority was to be applied to the overseas possessions of United States.”[29]

  American politician and German immigrant, Carl Schurz, stated the following:

“If they become states on the equal footing with the other states… they will take part in governing the whole republic, in governing us, by sending senators and representatives in our Congress to help us make laws, and by voting for president and vice-president to give our national government its executive. The prospect of the consequences which will follow the admission of Spanish creoles and the negroes of the West India islands and of the Malays and Tagals of the Philippines to participation in the conduct of our government is so alarming that you instinctively pause.”[30]

  English journalist and novelist, Rudyard Kipling, wrote the following:

Take up the White Man’s burden
Send forth the best ye breed
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captive’s need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.”[31]

  U.S. Senator R.F. Pettigrew stated:

Under our flag you can not have a republic and an empire. You can not have self-government and a government by force. One or the other will triumph. Either the republic will go down and the empire will survive, or we will at once retrace our steps to the ground and anchor our ship of state to the declaration and to the doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.[32]

 Puerto Rico status has not changed over this period, nor has that of its citizens. Just five years after Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship in the United States when Congress passed the Jones Act[33], Supreme Court ruled, by opinion of Chief Justice Taft, in Balzac v. Porto Rico[34] that the granting of United States citizenship meant for Puerto Ricans that they could move to the Mainland and there exercise full right as citizens, but that they were not entitled to the full rights of the United States citizens while residing in Puerto Rico, such in the Balzac case, the right to trial by jury.

  Recently Puerto Rico was struck by two hurricanes. The last one, Hurricane Maria destroy the island entire electric grid. Puerto Rico, before the passing of Hurricane Maria, was starting to feel some of the austerity measures imposed by the Oversight Board over the local government of Puerto Rico. Congress is currently discussing a legislative measure[35] for aid to Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico, the crucial difference is that the Puerto Rican government will currently get it as a loan, not as a grant like Texas and Florida. Puerto Ricans are American citizens, they do not need to hope that in the future the loan will be condoned. Wall Street doesn’t have the right to get rich in a humanitarian crisis. We deserve a grant. As American citizens, we deserve justice.[36]



[1] 136 S.Ct. 1863 (2016)
[2] 136 S.Ct. 1938 (2016)
[3] (Pub.L. 114-187, § 2, June 30, 2016, 130 Stat. 550.)
[4] See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 181 U.S. 222 (1901) {Dooley 1}; Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York and Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 51 (1901) {Dooley 2. Chief Justice Fuller dissenting opinion in this case gives us a perspective on how the Insular Cases and imperialism politics where in the center of important political matters of the time like the Rise and Fall of Economic Due Process or Economic Conservatism}; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1903).
[5] U.N. Charter art 73 (e). “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of the territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interest of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as sacred trust the obligation to promote to the outmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: … e… transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for informational purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to the economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapter XII and XIII apply.”  
[6] Compare the Treaty of Paris of 1898 article IX with the following prior treaties: 1) Treaty between U.S. and France for the cession of Louisiana (1803) article III; 2) Treaty between U.S. and Spain for the cession of Florida (1819) article VI; 3) Guadalupe Hidalgo: Treaty between U.S. and Mexico, article XI; 4) Alaska Purchase: Treaty between U.S. and Russia for the cession of Alaska (1867), article III. One year later in 1899 Hawaii was formally admitted to the United States as an incorporated territory consistent with the prior tradition of territorial expansion in American Legal History. The difference of this type of territory with Puerto Rico non-incorporated status is that with the first no matter how many years you are a territory it’s with the purpose of future admission as a state with full rights as the other citizens of the United States. Our status is not for future state admission, making us subject to constant discrimination by Congress in the distribution of federal funds. In Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church of Porto Rico 210 U.S. 296 (1908), the US Supreme Court agreed to support the "legal and political institutions" of Puerto Rico as specified in the terms of the Treaty of Paris, even though the use of public funds in support of the Catholic Church might seem to violate the Establishment Clause. Puerto Rico before the change in sovereignty didn't have separation of Church and State. Church was part of the political institutions of Puerto Rico. HOWEVER, in earlier cases adjudicating disputes over Mexican land grants in the American Southwest, the US Supreme Court felt no compunction to honor particular provisions spelled out in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 gave citizenship to the members of the territory as did the other treaty precedents before the Treaty of Paris. For a comparison of the Treaty of Paris with other treaties precedents like Article III of the 1867 Treaty with Russia see Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
[7] See Jose Trías Monge, Puerto Rico: The trials of the oldest colony in the world (1997).
[8] Annual Report of the Maj. General Commanding of the Army, Nelson A. Miles, Nov. 5, 1898, Messages, 1898-1899, at 31-32.
[9]  United States Department of War. General Orders and Circulations, 1898-1900. 3 vols. Department of PR, (1900).
[10] 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Compare the case with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) and Medellin v. Texas, 352 U.S. 491 (2008).
[11] 18 U.S.  317 (1820); See also Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. 164 (1853).
[12] 50 U.S. 602 (1851)
[13] 60 U.S. 393 (1857)
[14] “The Congress should have the power to dispose of and make all the needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing to this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any States; or any particular states.” U.S. Const. art. IV, section 3.
[15] Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty, U.S.- Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
[16] Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50,51 (1789).
[17] See 95 NW. U. L. Rev. 581 (2000-2001) The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority. The Founding Fathers rejected the social contract theory adopted by Hobbes (human nature was evil, thus it was necessary for the state to reach a social contract having total control of its subject, granting security, the most important thing) adopting John Locke’s social theory contract.
[18] 156 U.S. 1 (1895) Sugar Trust Case.
[19] 157 U.S. 329 (1895) Income Tax Case.
[20] 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
[21] 163 U.S. 537 (1896) Racial Segregation upheld under the doctrine Separate but Equal.
[22] 188 U.S. 321 (1903) Lottery Case.
[23] 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
[24] 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
[25] Henry K. Carroll, Report on the Island of Puerto Rico, Special Commission for the United States on Puerto Rico
[26] George W. Davis, Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs, Vol. 1, Pt. 13, Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, U.S. Government Printing Office 19-20 (1900).
[27] Foraker Act (Puerto Rico) chap. 191, 31 Stat. 77.
[28] With the Foraker Act, U.S. government in Puerto Rico established a civil government. 5 members of the Upper Body of the Legislature were Americans and also were the head of departments of the Executive. How can a public official hold office in both the Legislature and the Executive? With this “civil government” the Puerto Ricans were denied of having a government consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. For more information on territorial forms of government in American Legal History see: Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion in American Legal History, Part II. Governing Territory, Yale University Press, p. 121-151.
[29] Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946, at 15 (1972).
[30] Carl Schurz, American Imperialism, (1899).
[31] Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden, (1899).
[32] Senator R. F. Pettigrew, The Course of the Empire, (1921).
[33] Jones Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 145, section 2, 39 Stat. 951-952 (1917); In the House of Representatives of the United States, Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico Don. Luis Muñoz Rivera, brilliantly argue in Congress in favor of the Puerto Rican citizenship. Congress was planning, as they ultimately did, impose a second degree of citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. For the complete speech See Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 53 part. 8, 7470-7473; More than 15 times, between 1900-1915 the lower court of Puerto Rico (the only one represented at the time by the direct vote of the people), begged for citizenship and addition to the United States as a state. In 1917, when we were tired of begging, they then decided to impose us a second-degree citizenship. See Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal, (1985).
[34] 258 U.S. 298 (1922). The theory of Non-Incorporation, created by Justice White concurrent opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, became a doctrine establish by the majority of Supreme Court in Balzac. For example, 8 of the 10 Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Insular Cases during the Fuller Court term of 1901 were split decisions 5-4. A majority on the Court fully upheld the government 3 times (Downes v. Bidwell; Dooley v. United States II; Neely v. Henkel). Not a single judge position had the support of even 5 judges on the bench after the 1901 term (not Brown's extension theory, not White Incorporation Doctrine, and not Fuller and Harland's doctrine of the Constitution applying ex-propio vigore).
[36] "The signers of the Declaration of Independence of the United States said on July 4, 1776, that they held "these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;" and they added that " to secure these rights governments are instituted," and that these governments only derive "their just powers FROM the consent of the governed." The Puerto Rican people, in asking from the people to whom they have been aggregated that the principles of the first enactment to be found in their statute books be applied to them, are not looking for favors. THEY ARE DEMANDING JUSTICE" Puerto Rico League of Patriots, The Case of Porto Rico, (1899).

martes, 29 de agosto de 2017

The Establishment Clause and Public Schools


          I.     Introduction:

Most of the American colonies established a religion as a matter of law. The Church of England (also known as Episcopalians) was established as law in southern colonies like (Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia). In the New England colonies (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and the fourteenth state, Vermont), the established religion was undertaken as a matter of local parish law, and most parties established Congregationalism, formed from Puritan beliefs. The other New England colony, Rhode Island, had no established religion, a consequence of the views of its founder, Roger Williams. [1]

In the middle colonies (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware) some liberty of religious conscience existed during the colonial era. Pennsylvania, founded by the Quaker William Pen, granted some liberty of religious conscience to Roman Catholics and Jews, as well as Protestants. New Jersey and Delaware also permitted its residents the freedom of worship they desire.

The American Revolution led to the abolition of the Church of England as established religion in New York and the southern states. The local establishments in New England states remained in existence until the early nineteenth century, with Massachusetts becoming the last state to end a religious establishment in 1833. [2] The most famous disestablishment occurred in Virginia.[3] In June 1776, Virginia adopted a Declaration of Rights in preparation for a declaration of independence from England.[4] In the draft of the Declaration of Rights was a provision concerning religion. Virginians were owed “the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience[5].” James Madison persuaded the Virginia drafting committee to amend Article 16 as follows:

“That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the matter of discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by forced or violence, and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.”

In the 1784-1785 session of the Virginia General Assembly, a will was introduced to tax Virginians to pay for teachers of Christian religion. This was a “general assessment” (because it was assessed on al Virginians) bill, and the failure to pass this bill to the Assembly has been cited by the Supreme Court as indicative of the meaning of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment. Supporters of the general assessment included Patrick Henry, George Washington, and John Marshall. After the bill was sent to the counties for debate and discussion, Madison anonymously wrote a Memorial and Remonstrance against the propose general assessment.[6]

On January 16, 1786, a Bill establishing Religious Freedom was passed by Virginia General Assembly. Bill 82 declared “that the opinions of men are not object of civil government, not under its jurisdiction.” The Virginia Assembly then adopted its language:

“No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religion worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect the civil capacities.”

When the delegates of the Convention that eventually proposed the Constitution met in Philadelphia in mid-1787, the most important issue concerning religion was the No Religious Test Clause of Article VI.[7] The Constitutional Convention unanimously agreed to the following language: “But no religious test shall ever be required as qualification to any office or public trust of the United States.” Although religious tests for federal public office were barred, about half of the states conditioned public office on some religious test, some of which effectively barred Roman Catholics and Jews from public office by requiring test only Protestants could pass. It wasn’t until the 1960’s that the Supreme Court held the last existing religious test (Maryland) unconstitutional.[8]

On June 8, 1789, Virginia Representative James Madison, filling a campaign promise and responding to the demands of ratifying body of Virginia and other states, proposes approval by the House of amendments to the Constitution. Accompanying Madison proposal was a list of amendments. Three proposals concerned religion. To prevent infringement of religious freedom by the federal government, Madison proposes: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious beliefs or worship, nor shall any religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or in any pretext, infringed.” On September 25, 1789, Congress agreed to the following language: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof.”

       II.     The Non-Establishment Clause:

The Supreme Court interpretation of the Non-Establishment Clause was sparse before mid 20th century. In Bradfield v. Roberts[9], the Court rejected a claim that congressional funding of the construction of a hospital own by a corporation formed by a Catholic religious order violated the Non-Establishment Clause. The Court focused on the hospital’s charity as a charter organization, rather than the person who owned the hospital: “Whether the individuals who composed the corporation under its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious organization, or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest consequence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can the individual beliefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators be inquired into.[10]

In Quick Bear v. Leupp[11] the issue was whether the Native Americans were permitted to use their own money (Indian trust and treaty funds) to educate their children in Catholic schools. The money was held in trust for the Indian tribes by the federal government. The Court held that Native Americans could use their trust and treaty funds to support religious education because it was their money, nor the government’s.[12]

In Everson v. Board of Education[13],  a case that saw the birth of the wall of separation[14] doctrine, a New Jersey statue gave the power to its local districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools. The appellee was a township board of education, who acting pursuant to the power of the statue, authorized reimbursement to parents of money expanded by them for bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public transportation system. The Court concluded: “Its legislation, as applied, does not more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safety and expeditiously to and from accredited schools. The First Amendment has created a wall between church and state. The wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey Has not breached it here.”

The Court appears to be ready to declare the busing system unconstitutional, only to redefine the case as one involving general welfare, making the transportation program for Catholic school children a constitutional exercise of state’s police power.[15] The opinion of the Supreme Court declared that the Non-Establishment Clause means the following:

“Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly and secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”

The Court’s opinion analogizes the transportation of children to and from religious schools to “state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from schools from the very real hazards of traffic. It also notes: “Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit children to attend schools witch the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks. Those kind of services the Court concluded: “So separate and so indisputably mark off from the religious function, they do not violate the neutrality demanded of the government in this area of law.” Safety, of course, is a classic police power rationale.[16]

Everson declares that the proper governmental stance toward religion is one of neutrality. Does it adequately define neutrality? Religious liberty may be described as an individual right for believers. At a broader level of generality religious liberty may be understood as one aspect of the broad idea of individual autonomy from government and other. Is religious liberty is interpreted as the latter, then the duty of the court is to protect individual choices, among which is the choice to be (or not to be) religious. If liberty is understood as protecting one’s conscience, or one’s duty to a higher or other power, then choice fails to capture the position of some religious individuals, who believe to be bound by duty rather than by liberty to commit themselves to some religious motivated action. Justice Rutledge’s dissent also concludes that religion has one meaning, a conclusion accepted by the Court. [17]

In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education[18] the Court held unconstitutional a law as respecting an establishment of religion. Public schools in Illinois allowed religious teachers (priests, ministers, rabbis) to provide religion instruction in the school during the school day. Students who chose religious instruction were released from the public-school duties for such instruction. The remaining students left their classroom to continue their secular studies. The Court held: “This released time program was a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public-school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.” This type of action violated the principle of separation underlying the non-establishment of religion.

The Supreme Court distance itself from the wall of separation metaphor in its decision in 1970 in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664. Waltz claimed that a New York law granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations was a law respecting an establishment of religion. The court stated:

“The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”

The Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman[19] had to determine the constitutionality of types of aid granted to religious schools or granted to the children who attended religious schools, their parents and guardians. The Lemon test combines the tests from school prayer and Walz cases. A law challenge as violating the Nonestablishment Clause must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2) have as a principal or primary effect neither the advancement nor inhibition of religion; 3) not foster and excessive entanglement with religion.

What are Religious Acts in the Public Schools? What type of used can be allowed by religious Groups in Public Schools? 

Case
Issue
Result
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
May a state require a public prayer and require public-school students to recite it?
Daily invocation is a religious activity that violates the Nonestablishment Clause
School Dist. Of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
May a state require reading of ten verses of Bible and saying Lord’s prayer at the beginning of public school day, as long as it provides exemption for nonbelievers?
Reading and saying a prayer constitute religious exercises, which violates the Nonestablishment Clause; state must be firmly committed to position of neutrality; exemption for nonbelievers immaterial for coercion inapt in Nonestablishent Clause.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
May a state ban the teaching of evolution in public schools?
Law has an unconstitutional religious purpose, violating principle of religious neutrality.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
May a state require public schools to post Ten Commandments on wall of the classroom?
No secular purpose in posting of Ten Commandments in public school classrooms.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Is a statue requiring a moment of silent in public school classrooms at beginning of the day constitutional?
Legislature possessed religious purpose in adopting moment of silence “for mediation or voluntary prayer,” making law unconstitutional.
Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
Is Louisiana law requiring “balance treatment for creation-science and evolution-science in public school instruction” constitutional?
Purpose of law religious, not secular, and thus unconstitutional.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
Are invocation and benediction prayers by clergy at middle and high school graduation ceremonies constitutional?
Attendance at ceremony “ in fair and real sense obligatory” and constitutes impermissible compulsion to pray.
Santa Fe Independent School. District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
Does program allowing high school students to select someone to give non-sectarian prayer at high school football game violates de Nonestablishment Clause?
Government directly involved in religious activity by establishing policy and some required to attend game, which is unconstitutional’ voluntary prayer is permissible 



Case
Issue
Result
Wildamar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
May state university refuse access to religious student organization of otherwise open classroom space?
University decision violates Free Speech Clause; its refusal was not required by the Nonestablishment Clause.
Bd. of Education of Westside Comm. Schools v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
Does a federal law giving “equal access” to student groups, including religious student groups, to public school rooms otherwise available for use violates the Nonestablishment Clause?
Law is neutral between religion and non-religion, and so does not violate the Nonestablishment Clause.
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center for Moriches Union Free Sch. District 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
Is a school board refusal to allow religious group to use public school property when unused for other school activities and when other social and political groups may use property constitutional?
Based on the facts of the case, action by school board unconstitutionally discriminated on basis of viewpoint of group.
Rosenberg v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
Is refusal of state university to pay for publishing costs of religious student organization, when it paid for similar cost of non-religious student organizations, constitutional?
University of Virginia engaged in viewpoint discrimination, violating the Free Speech Clause. Nonestablishment no bar to payments.
Good News Club v. Milfront Cent. School 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
Is public school’s refusal to allow a religious group for children ages 6-12 to use its property when not otherwise in use constitutional?
Action violated Free Speech Clause by discriminating against a group on viewpoint discrimination grounds.
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California Hastings College of Law v. Martinez 561 U.S. 661 (2010)
May a public law school condition its official recognition of a religious student group and used of school funds and facilities on agreement by group to admit to group all students?
Policy was viewpoint neutral and thus constitutional.


The Non-Establishment Clause and Aid to Religiously-Affiliated Schools, Parents and/or Students Who Attend Such Schools (1971- Present)


Case
Constitutional
Unconstitutional
Justification
Tilton v. Richardson 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
Federal grant program to aid construction of facilities for secular purposes used by religious universities

Colleges, unlike grade schools and high schools, not pervasively sectarian and no excessive entanglement
Hunt v. McNair 413 U.S. 734 (1973)
State bond authority used to finance building facilities for secular purposes by religious universities

College not pervasively sectarian, so able to separate religious and secular parts of college
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist 413 U.S. 756 (1973)  

Tuition tax credit for parents
Primary effect to aid religion, particularly Catholic schools, by reducing effective cost of tuition.
Sloan v. Lemon 413 U.S. 756 (1973)

Tuition reimbursement to parents
Primary effect to aid religion
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education 413 U.S. 472 (1973)

Reimbursement of state mandated costs to school per student
Primary effect to aid religion, might be used to pay for non-secular educational costs
Meek v. Pittenger  421 U.S. 349 (1975)
Loan of secular textbooks
On-site educational services given to the public employees; loan of instructional materials such as maps, globes, audio-visual equipment
Textbooks permitted in Bd. Educ. v. Allen (1968); public employees might promote religion; materials aid religion
Roemer v. Board of Public Works 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
Subsidy of students at religious colleges equal to 15% of aid given to state college students
Bus transportation to field trip
Universities not pervasively sectarian; bus expense aid to religion
Wolamn v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
Off-site diagnostic and remedial services, loan of secular textbooks; funds to provide and evaluate standardized texts also used in public schools
Loan of instruction material to students
No aid to religion; loan of books approved in Allen; loan of instructions materials aid to religion; test have secular purposes, no primary effect to aid religion, and no excessive entanglement.
New York v. Cathedral Academy 434 U.S. 125 (1977)

Reimbursement to school for state mandate costs
Following Levitt, aids religion, excessive entanglement to ensure used only for secular purposes
Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
Reimbursement to school for costs in testing and reporting

Primary effect is neutral; pays only administrative advice
Mueller v. Allen 436 U.S. 388 (1983)
Tax deduction for educational expenses incurred in sending child to any school.

Primary benefit is to taxpayers, not to schools, and fact that more than 90% of money go to parents whose children attend religious schools is irrelevant
Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402 (1985)

Remedial education for children at religious schools may not be on site.
Unable to ensure no religious indoctrination of children will occur during on site remedial education
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 473 U.S. 373 (1985)

Public School teachers teaching secular subjects at religious schools through shared time program.
Creates excessive entanglement between church and state; allows religious schools to spend less money on secular subjects and more on religious subjects.
Witters v. Wash Dept. of Services for the Blind 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
Paying tuition at college of blind student’s choice.

Program of instruction not pervasively sectarian.
Bowen v. Kendrick 484 U.S. (1987)
Grants by federal government to churches and religious institutions to create sexual education programs.

General welfare program not designed to advance religion; religious institutions not necessarily excluded from program
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 509 U.S 1 (1993)
On site interpreters for deaf students at religious high school

Neutral program; student attending religious school not necessarily barred
Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
Overrules Aguilar and Grand Rapids; on site remedial education for poor children in religious schools permissible

Assumption of possible advancement of religion impermissible; facts do not indicate any indoctrination or inculcation; welfare program aiding the poor.
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
Overrules aspects of Meek and Wolman; permits lending of instruction materials, including books, maps, globes, audio-visual equipment, computer equipment and software.

No evidence materials used to advance religion 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
Tuition vouchers given parents of children to use at any school, including religious school

Voucher creates a private choice to attend public, private or religious school so does not advance religion; Nyquist inapplicable.




[1]  Williams was a religious seeker who debated the correctness of establishing churches as a matter of law. He feared the contamination of the Church by the world. Williams wrote of the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world. When the hedge or wall was demolished by the Church, God made “His garden a wilderness as at this day.”
[2]  The other New England states abolished their religious establishments between 1807 and 1819.
[3]  Despite the fact the Church of England was the established church in Virginia in 1776, a number of residents of the colony were Presbyterians, and Baptists were increasing in number as well.
[4]  The declaration of rights was largely written by George Mason.
[5]  The idea of “toleration” instead of rights was insufficient to some Virginians, including James Madison, wo later helped frame the Constitution and drafted the First Amendment.
[6]  The Memorial and Remonstrance is one of the most important documents in the American history of law and religion.
[7]  English practice often demanded that persons attaining public offices swear an oath proclaiming their faith as members of the Church of England. The Clause prohibited this practice for any office of the United States.
[8]Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
[9] 175 U.S. 291 (1899)
[10] Ruling formal in the sense of ignoring the fact that the corporation was created by a Roman Catholic order. One recurring issue is whether the Court should accept this formalist/realist distinction in determining whether the law violated the Non-Establishment Clause.
[11] 210 U.S 50 (1908)
[12] Formal approach to the Non-Establishment Clause?
[13] 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
[14] Doctrine adopted from Jefferson’s wall of separation metaphor from his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the case adopt the doctrine of the letter, but reach opposite conclusions adopting their own versions the history of Virginia’s concern towards religious liberty.
[15] U.S. Const. amend. X
[16] A good way of developing constitutional analysis of cases is by asking yourself after reading a case, either the opinion of the Court, concurrent or dissenting, if you found it persuasive enough. Did you found this opinion persuasive?
[17]  A unitary definition of religion requires the Court to interpret the Non-Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause in a way that allows them to mesh. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate and provide further research to show different ways the Court has failed to harmonize those norms.
[18] 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
[19] 403 U.S. 602 (1971)